Recent work has shown that intelligent neighbor selection during construction can significantly enhance the performance of peer-to-peer overlay networks. While its impact on performance has been recognized, few have examined the impact of neighbor selection on network resilience. In this paper, we study the impact with a generalized cost model for overlay construction that takes into consideration different types of heterogeneity, such as node capacity and network proximity. Our simulation results show that the resulting performance improvement comes at the cost of static resilience against targeted attacks.
Introduction
Recent research has shown structured peer-to-peer overlay networks to provide scalable and resilient abstractions to large-scale applications [7, 9, 10, 13, 18] . They support routing to endpoints or nodes inside a network requiring only logarithmic routing state at each node. Nodes in structured peer-to-peer networks choose their neighbors based on optimization metrics. A recent study by Gummadi et al. [5] shows that neighbor selection based on network proximity significantly improves overall performance.
However, such neighbor selection can lead to a unbalanced overlay structure. Figure 1 shows a snapshot of the number of incoming edges (in-degree) and outgoing edges (out-degree) of nodes in a Bamboo [9] overlay running on PlanetLab [4] . Because the overlay uses proximity neighbor selection, some nodes in the system are more popular (have higher in-degree) than others. The impact of such a skewed degree distribution on the static resilience of networks has yet to be quantified. The focus of our study is to look at the impact of different neighbor selections on static resilience and performance of networks.
To better model neighbor selection across these networks, we first present a generalized cost model. While the heterogeneity of Internet hosts in bandwidth, internode latency and availability are well measured [11] , most current protocols only consider network proximity in neighbor selection. Thus we use different neighbor selection models based on network proximity and node capacity. We study the impact they have on lookup latency and static resilience by incorporating the neighbor selection algorithms into ring and tree geometries, and show that the performance improvement from exploiting network proximity or node capacity comes at a price of increased vulnerability against targeted attacks.
The paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section 2 and describe details of the neighbor selection model in Section 3. We then measure the impact of different cost functions on both resilience and performance in Section 4 and conclude in Section 5.
The closest work to ours was done by Gummadi et al. [5] . The authors quantified the impact of routing geometry on performance and static resilience. In contrast, we focus on the impact of neighbor selection on these factors. Albert et al. [1] show a clear correlation between the scale-free nature of networks and resilience to attacks and failures.
Several research efforts propose optimizing overlay construction of structured overlays using the network proximity metric [2, 8, 14, 16, 18] , but generally ignore other factors such as CPU load, storage and bandwidth capacity. Brocade [17] proposes the use of supernodes for more efficient routing, but requires static selection of supernodes.
Other work [6] proposes the use of multiple "virtual servers" for load balancing among nodes of varying resource capacity, but does not consider network proximity for routing performance. Gia [3] performs continuous topology adaptation on an unstructured overlay such that nodes participate with network degree matching their resource capacity, without considering network proximity.
Structured Overlay Construction
In the construction of structured peer-to-peer networks, each node chooses neighbors that meet logical identifier constraints (e.g., prefix matching or identifier range), and builds directional links to them. These constraints are flexible such that a number of nodes are possible neighbors for each routing table entry. Intelligent selection of neighbors from the set of possible neighbor nodes significantly impacts the overlay's performance, resilience, and load balancing properties.
The neighbor selection problem can be reduced to a generalized cost minimization problem. We present here a generalized cost model that captures general node and link characteristics during neighbor selection. Ideally, optimizing neighbor selection for node means minimizing the sum of the cost from to all other nodes. The cost from to ¡ consists of two factors: cost incurred by intermediate overlay nodes (node cost:
) and cost incurred by overlay network links (edge cost: 
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For structured networks such as Chord, Pastry, and Tapestry, the cost function is defined as:
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where is the neighbor index, y is the neighbor indexed by , § is the number of neighbors, is the set of destinations routed through the neighbor
is the node cost value of ,
is the edge cost between two nodes , including latency, throughput, reliability, availability, monetary cost, or any combination thereof. For example, choosing high capacity nodes as neighbors can decrease lookup latency and increase the overall lookup processing capacity of the system. On the other hand, using availability as a metric creates a more stable network.
Note that our idealized cost function assumes full knowledge of the network components, and is therefore not feasible in practice. Since most peer-to-peer protocols focus on optimizing neighbor tables locally, we will focus on the application of our cost function to the cost of the first overlay hop. Therefore, we focus on neighbor selections that consider the first hop and optimize latency under uniform traffic (c
). Table 1 shows the four neighbor selection cost functions. Random chooses neighbors randomly. Dist chooses neighbors physically closest in the network to adapt to the underlying network topology. Currently, Bamboo, Pastry, and Tapestry use this mechanism. Cap chooses neighbors that have the smallest processing delay. CapDist chooses neighbors that gives the smallest combined latency, which is the sum of the node processing delay and the overlay link delay. 
Simulation Results
In this section, we present simulation results that quantify the performance benefits of using intelligent neighbor selection algorithms. We also examine the impact such algorithms have on the static resilience of the resulting overlay to randomized failures and targeted attacks.
Simulation Setup
We simulate the Tapestry [18] and Chord [13] protocols as representatives of their respective geometries (tree and ring). When each node optimizes its cost function, it performs random sampling to select neighbors and choose the best one among the samples. In our experiments, we use 32 samples for each routing level in Tapestry or each finger in Chord.
Our simulations use 5100 node transit-stub network topologies generated using the GT-ITM library [15] . We construct Chord and Tapestry overlays of 4096 nodes by placing overlay nodes to random physical locations. We gather results with 9 different configurations for GT-ITM, generate 3 transit-stub topologies each, and choose For our Chord experiments, each node forwards messages to the live neighbor that is closest to the destination in the identifier space. The lookup fails if all neighbors before the destination in the namespace fail. For Tapestry, each node forwards messages to the first live neighbor matching one more prefix digit. If all primary and backup links in the routing entry fail, the lookup fails.
Performance
We begin by quantifying the effects of neighbor selection algorithms on performance. We look at two different distributions of node processing delay: uniform and bimodal. Because Tapestry and Chord results are similar in both cases, we will only show Tapestry results.
We start by assigning node processing delay from a coarse-grained uniform distribution. We assign the processing delay uniformly from
where is the maximum processing delay. Figure 2 shows average lookup latency over all node pairs in Tapestry. By exploiting network proximity and heterogeneous capacity, CapDist achieves the best lookup performance. When processing delay variation is high ( =1s), CapDist performs 30
better than Dist and 48 better than Random. When no variation exists, (i.e., =0s), Dist and CapDist exploit network proximity to outperform Random and Cap.
We now look at a bimodal model for processing capacity, where nodes are either fast or slow. Fast nodes process 100 lookup messages per second while slow nodes process 1 message per second. Figure 3 shows that as we vary the fraction of fast nodes from 0 to 20 , neighbor selection using capacity (Cap and CapDist) favors routes through fast nodes and achieves better performance. For instances where the variation in processing capacity is extremely high, we expect that capacity utilization at fast nodes will be limited by the routing constraints of the pro- tocol, and the deployment of virtual nodes is necessary to fully exploit the excess processing capacity.
Using latency optimization creates uneven distributions of nodes' incoming node degrees. Nodes near the center of the network (i.e., transit domains) and nodes with high capacity are preferred, and minimize path latency by utilizing low latency links or low processing delay. Figure 4 shows the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of nodes' in-degrees in Tapestry networks with different neighbor selection algorithms. Unlike Random, results from cost-optimized overlays show slow transitions and long tails. We also observe that the CDF of nodes in transit domains is more skewed and has longer tails than that of nodes in stub domains.
Static Resilience
Previous work by Albert et al. showed an inherent tradeoff for unstructured networks between resilience against random node failures and resilience against targeted attacks [1] . In this section, we explore through simulation the impact that neighbor selection algorithms have on static resilience.
We measure resilience as the proportion of all pairs of live endpoints that can still route to each other via the overlay after an external event, either randomized node failures or targeted attacks. We assume attacks focus on removing nodes with the highest in-degree in order to maximize damage to overall network reachability. For these experiments, we assume nodes have an uniform processing delay distribution with = 0.5s. For Tapestry, we examine resilience of the base protocol, the base protocol plus additional backup routes (all chosen using a number of neighbor selection algorithms), and the base protocol plus backup routes chosen at random. Note that adding two backup links triples the number of neighbors. For Chord, we examine the base protocol and the base protocol plus sequential neighbors.
Random Node Failures
We first examine the impact of randomized node failures. In general, we would expect that using selection algorithms that prefer high capacity nodes results in more hierarchy in the network, where many weaker nodes are connected by highly interconnected high capacity nodes. In such cases, we expect that randomized failures will disconnect weaker nodes from the network, but have a rela- tively low impact on overall connectivity. Figures 5 and 6 show the failure tolerance of Tapestry and Chord, respectively. Surprisingly, we see the failure tolerance is a little affected by neighbor selections. The tighter outgoing link constraints of structured peer to peer networks allow less variation in the resulting topology than unstructured networks. Every node has at least hops regardless of neighbor selection cost functions, the probability of meeting randomly failed nodes in a lookup will be similar.
Adding backup links in Tapestry and sequential neighbors in Chord dramatically improves failure tolerance. Note that in Tapestry, failure curves change from an exponentially increasing curve to a smooth S-shaped curve due to path redundancy when backup links are added.
Targeted Node Attacks
While structured peer to peer protocols define a minimum number of outgoing links per node, a node's number of incoming links is unrestricted. This means that neighbor selection algorithms considering capacity will skew the network such that powerful nodes have significantly higher in-degrees than weaker nodes. This means that like the unstructured networks studied by Albert et al., structured peer to peer overlays that consider capacity in neighbor selection are vulnerable to attacks.
As shown in Figures 7 and 8 , attacking nodes with high in-degree affects network connectivity severely. Random shows the best attack tolerance among neighbor selections. CapDist has worse attack tolerance than Dist, although it has better performance as shown in Section 4.2.
This result demonstrates a fundamental tradeoff between performance and attack resilience in structured overlay construction. The performance gain from neighbor selection algorithms increases the variability of indegrees among nodes. Nodes with high capacity or nodes near the center of the network end up with high in-degrees and have a disproportionately large impact on network connectivity when they fail.
Analysis of Extra Redundancy
We observe that adding backup links or sequential neighbors can increase attack tolerance significantly. Randomly choosing backup links in Tapestry and sequential neighbors in Chord avoids routing hotspots that are vulnerable to targeted attacks. In Tapestry for example, costoptimized backup links are less effective at improving attack tolerance than random backup links. Paying the additional cost of maintaining extra links improves static resilience against targeted attacks.
Another technique to improve tolerance is to impose a maximum in-degree per node, but this restriction increases lookup latency. Bounding the degree of overlay nodes can be used as a defense against Eclipse attacks [12] .
Conclusion
Previous research argued for the consideration of network or physical characteristics of nodes in overlay construction. In this paper, we take a quantitative approach to examining the benefits and costs of considering such criteria in overlay construction.
We present a generalized model for neighbor selection that incorporates metrics for network proximity and available resources (capacity), and show that while considering these factors can lead to significant gains in routing performance, these benefits come with their associated costs. We find that the choice of neighbor selection algorithm drives a tradeoff between performance and resilience to attacks.
Optimized structured overlays have unbalanced structures. These overlays do not bound the number of incoming links per node. Thus central nodes in a network or nodes with more resources will have much higher indegree than others. Should high degree nodes be attacked, the impact on network connectivity is severe. On the other hand, the minimum out-degree means even for overlays that optimize towards proximity or available resources, most nodes achieve enough resilience against randomized failures.
As future work, we intent to investigate the resilience of different geometries under different neighbor selection algorithms. We also plan to investigate the impact of these neighbor selection algorithms on dynamic resilience, such as when maintenance algorithms repair failures over time.
